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Complete Gesture &…
Enrico Guglielminetti
1 … eschatology. Imagine: it’s a sunny morning of January 20, 1961 in Washington D. C. JFK
is delivering his presidential inaugural speech. He has just taken his oath of office. All of
people is listening to him with attention and admiration (somebody perhaps with envy
and hate). It’s his complete gesture (henceforth CG), the CG both of a man and of a nation.
Recognition of identity through change [A=B] takes place, from the very beginning of the
presidential address, as recognition of the identity (through change) of the whole nation:
We observe today not a victory of party but a celebration of freedom – symbolizing
an end as well as a beginning – signifying renewal as well as change. For I have
sworn before you and Almighty God the same solemn oath our forbears prescribed
nearly a century and three quarters ago.
2 The celebrated apex of  this  gesture  comes  just  before  the  end:  “Ask  not  what  your
country can do for you – ask what you can do for your country.” Every gesture like this
carries a historical index, as Walter Benjamin would say: freedom – the core business of
the nation – is endangered. It’s the now-time of responsibility:
In the long history of the world, only a few generations have been granted the role
of defending freedom in its hour of maximum danger. I do not shrink from this
responsibility – I welcome it.
3 If, as Maddalena suggests, identity is recognition of identity, we can’t imagine a figural (in
the sense of Dante and Auerbach) re-presentation of JFK’s identity, without imagining a
re-occurrence of this very speech. JFK speaks presidentially, like Jesus breaks the bread
and Ulysses strings the bow. Speaking is however, in the case of JFK, a political act. You
cannot have/recognize his identity, without having this speech. You cannot have this
speech, without having politics. You cannot have politics, without having “both sides” –
friends and foes – who should negotiate: “Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us
never fear to negotiate.” The question is: what about politics/negotiation in paradise? In
other words: if CG carries a historical index (“knowing that here on earth God’s work
must truly be our own”), and if CGs define our identity, paradise is to be represented
either as erasure of identity, or as repetition of history. Something like that could be said
about stringing the bow. Ulysses’ gesture remains in a sense abstract, if we separate it
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from its very context: the mortal conflict between Odysseus and the young suitors. How
could a complete synthetic pattern run the risk of abstraction?
4 …  Dido.  “Adgnosco  veteris  vestigia  flammae.” Everyone  remembers  Dido’s  words:  “I
recognize the signs of the old flame” (Aen. IV: 23). Dido’s identity depends completely on
her passion-love for Aeneas. She has, in a sense, no property apart from her relationship
with  him.  What  about  these  strange  relational  properties (namely,  intrinsic  properties
which are external relations)? The other-wordly (or eschatological) identity/recognition
of identity of Dido is unthinkable, without taking into account her passiveness. Are there
gestures which are feelings? Does the concept of CG include only the subject’s activities or
does it extend also to our passivity? What does a semiotic treatment of these “signs”
(vestigia) look like?
5 … dis-continuity. The theory of CG inherits the pragmatist account of experience based
on mathematical continuum. However, experience is above all dis-continuity. It’s hard to
say, for instance, that Auschwitz is situated in a continuum of possibilities. The metaphor
of drawing a line on a blackboard seems to suggest that possibility (the white surface)
precedes actuality (the line). Experience and history, however, hardly work so. Existential
possibility can be regarded as a consequence of reality, not the other way around. First
comes the gesture, then its shadow (the possibility) is added to it. If we interpret actuality
as  the  pivot,  which  allows  for  the  transformation  of  possibility  into  necessity,  our
philosophy minimizes the unforeseeable features of reality (also the miraculous ones). So
Hegel’s famous criticism of mathematics keeps on being important in philosophy. I would
be glad if Maddalena’s theory of CG (which in its essence is a philosophy of freedom and
actuality) could become more independent from a scheme of possibility-necessity.
6 … synthesis. I deeply appreciate the idea of a synthetic philosophy. Synthesis, however,
can  be  interpreted  in  different  ways.  Not  necessarily  synthesis  excludes  separation.
Modernity is  the time of  separation,  and the project of  forgetting Kant seems to me
dangerous,  inasmuch  as  it  implies  –  or  seems  to  imply  –  a  negative  evaluation  of
modernity. Kantian dualism has obviously its limits, but reminds us that a thought is not
reducible to a physical object, and that the world – despite is reasonableness – is always
also a place of tension, separation and even madness. A synthetic philosophy need not be
a philosophy of continuity and reasonableness. A complete synthetic pattern need not
forget the divisions of reality, of which Kant was so aware.
7 …  analysis.  Analytic  philosophy  fails  first  of  all  because  it  doesn’t  deliver  a  real
philosophical analysis.  Far from reducing physics to a more fundamental philosophical
principle (like being,  becoming,  the form of the Good…),  analytic philosophy inherits
from physics the basic bricks of reality (space-time points or what have you): physics
becomes  therefore  the  true  philosophy,  while  philosophy  is  reduced  to  a  sterile
commentary of physics. We have long since no philosophical analysis. If we bring analysis
back to its philosophical meaning, I  do not see in principle any contradiction between
philosophical analysis and philosophical synthesis.
8 … words. Philosophy itself has its gestures. In the history of philosophy gestures are
probably  words,  like  substance  for  Aristotle,  One for  Plotinus,  critique for  Kant…  An
illustrated  book  of  philosophy  should  read  the  k-words  of  our  discipline  as  bodily
postures. Philosophers could be pictorially represented: everyone with his gesture, with
his favourite word, through which s/he makes her/his attempt to grasp and celebrate the
“breadth and length and height and depth” of reality and its additions. 
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